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NO. 25 JUNE 2020 Introduction 
The Great Carve-Up 
Libya’s Internationalised Conflicts after Tripoli 
Wolfram Lacher 
The yearlong offensive on Tripoli by Khalifa Haftar’s forces has suffered fatal set-
backs, and Libya’s conflicts are changing shape. Russia’s and Turkey’s attempts at 
carving out spheres of influence are bound to collide with the interests of other for-
eign powers and with the fluidity of Libya’s political landscape. Haftar could face 
increasing challenges to his authority over eastern and southern Libya. Rivalries with-
in the anti-Haftar alliance will also return to the fore. Foreign intervention and the 
deep rifts that the war has inflicted on Libyan society will be the key obstacles to a 
political settlement. Western states should focus on preserving Libya’s unity and 
countering Russian influence as a matter of priority. 
 
With major support from Turkey, forces 
aligned with the Tripoli-based Government 
of National Accord (GNA) in April and May 
2020 inflicted a string of setbacks on Haftar 
and compelled his forces in Tripoli to retreat 
south of the city. A key moment came on 
23 May with the withdrawal of mercenaries 
by the Russian private military company 
Wagner Group. Airstrikes from Turkish-
operated drones were suspended as the 
mercenaries left, suggesting that Haftar’s 
Tripoli offensive ultimately fell victim to 
a Turkish-Russian understanding. Russia 
retains mercenaries in central Libya, where 
it has also recently stationed fighter jets in 
Haftar’s support. Russian military support 
remains essential to Haftar’s survival by de-
terring GNA advances beyond Tripolitania. 
Haftar’s serious setbacks in Tripoli show 
how decisive foreign support has become 
for both sides since Haftar launched his 
offensive in April 2019. Military support 
from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, 
and Russia as well as political backing from 
the US and France accorded Haftar a major 
advantage. Turkey, the GNA’s only notable 
foreign supporter, provided limited assis-
tance in the war’s early months, and sus-
pended it during autumn 2019, allowing 
Haftar’s forces to make progress in Tripoli. 
Turkey only resumed its support after 
forcing the GNA into an agreement over 
maritime rights in November 2019. Con-
trary to the covert foreign support for 
Haftar, Turkish intervention was overt, and 
it rapidly altered the balance of power after 
the fighting escalated in late March 2020. 
Covert UAE support in the form of drones 
and air defence systems proved ineffective 
in the face of Turkish military action. 
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A Shifting Landscape 
Haftar’s losses in Tripoli have major impli-
cations for Libya’s conflict landscape. The 
two warring camps are alliances of con-
venience, and the failure of Haftar’s power 
bid will reshape them. Armed groups from 
western Libya that go back to the 2011 war 
against Qadhafi form the bulk of the forces 
fighting Haftar. Many had been in rivalry 
with each other before uniting against 
Haftar, and although nominally loyal to the 
GNA, they are often deeply resentful of it. 
Haftar, in turn, mobilised a heterogene-
ous coalition of forces that hoped to sweep 
to power with him. They include units he 
built up in recent years in eastern Libya, but 
also armed groups from western and south-
ern Libya whose loyalty to him is often 
doubtful. Among them, hardline Salafis 
and former supporters of the Qadhafi 
regime form prominent subgroups. 
The immediate question for the trajectory 
of the conflict concerns the fate of Tarhuna, 
the city that served as the primary base for 
Haftar’s offensive. The militia of the Kani 
brothers (or “Kaniyat”) had established its 
control over Tarhuna from 2014 onwards 
by killing hundreds of people. Since joining 
Haftar’s alliance at the beginning of his 
Tripoli offensive, the Kaniyat have com-
mitted more crimes to maintain control. 
The GNA-aligned forces include hundreds 
of men from Tarhuna who have lost family 
members or homes due to the Kaniyat’s 
actions. But many in the anti-Haftar forces 
regard Tarhuna as collectively supportive 
of Haftar and the Kaniyat. 
A GNA effort to take Tarhuna risks pro-
voking a protracted conflict that would 
involve retribution both against the Kaniyat 
and the community as a whole. Since there 
is widespread fear of indiscriminate vio-
lence in Tarhuna, many in the city would 
be likely to join the fight against the GNA 
to defend their families and community. 
Whether GNA forces can take control of 
Tarhuna depends on Russia’s and the UAE’s 
willingness to continue propping up Haf-
tar’s allies in the town. A retreat from Tar-
huna would remove the threat Haftar poses 
to Tripoli. It would also establish Turkey 
as the dominant foreign power in western 
Libya, and Russia as the guarantor that GNA 
forces will not go on the offensive beyond 
Tripolitania. 
Ramifications East, South, West 
Turkish and Russian attempts to freeze 
the conflict are bound to collide with the 
political ramifications of Haftar’s setbacks 
in Tripoli. A wide-ranging realignment of 
allegiances and alliances is likely to ensue. 
The institutions that have served as the 
interlocutors for Russia and Turkey – the 
GNA and Haftar’s Libyan Arab Armed 
Forces – will come under pressure and 
could ultimately crumble. 
In western Libya, Haftar’s offensive 
served as a unifying threat. While Haftar’s 
forces were advancing and liable to exploit 
divisions among his enemies, many held 
back their anger over corruption in the 
GNA and kept their political ambitions in 
check. These frustrations and rivalries will 
now come to the fore. This is not necessarily 
only a negative prospect. The impossibility 
of reforming the GNA without reopening 
the 2015 Libyan Political Agreement that 
created it has long allowed unaccountable 
politicians with no meaningful base to pur-
sue their rent-seeking activities. To become 
more effective, the government in Tripoli 
needs to become more accountable to the 
forces on the ground. 
In much of southern Libya, Haftar’s in-
fluence is tenuous. Politicians and armed 
groups in the south declared their loyalty to 
Haftar, expecting him to provide funds and 
services, and betting that he would prevail 
in Tripoli. Now that he can deliver neither, 
many will seek to mend fences with the 
GNA. This process of realignment is likely 
to be protracted and prone to trigger con-
flict, since the region is divided along com-
munal lines and between competing armed 
groups. Russian and Emirati military sup-
port to Haftar could dissuade armed groups 
in the south from shifting allegiances, or it 
could lead to conflicts following such shifts. 
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Haftar’s grip is strongest in eastern Libya, 
where many politicians and militia leaders 
will see their fortunes as being tied to his 
fate. Much of eastern Libyan society is wary 
of the instability that would come with Haf-
tar’s demise. But fighters who are returning 
disillusioned from a lost war in Tripoli could 
turn against him. Benghazi militia leaders 
who have long been latently disloyal to 
him could seize the opportunity to reassert 
themselves. Political opposition could 
coalesce around the head of the eastern-
based rump parliament, Agilah Saleh, or 
around a movement for eastern autonomy 
that Haftar had suppressed for the past few 
years. The numerous politicians, business-
men, and fighters who fled the Haftar-
controlled east in the recent past could ally 
with Haftar’s opponents in order to return. 
Unless Haftar eventually succeeds in his 
attempts at illegally selling oil, these strug-
gles will unfold while he faces growing 
difficulties in raising funds. If Haftar’s struc-
ture founders, the considerable grievances 
his violent rise caused could return to the 
fore. Violent conflicts would follow. 
Challenges to a Condominium 
Further questions over the sustainability 
of a Turkish-Russian arrangement in Libya 
concern their interest in a Libyan political 
settlement, and the opposition such an 
arrangement would provoke from other 
foreign powers. 
A Russian-Turkish understanding does 
not necessarily mean an end to fighting, 
nor would it be immune to periodic break-
down and renegotiation. But if Haftar’s 
forces withdraw from Tripolitania, mutual 
deterrence by Russia and Turkey may well 
put an end to large-scale hostilities. Even in 
that scenario, however, the prospects for 
political negotiations are slim. Since Haftar 
launched his Tripoli offensive, most politi-
cal actors in western Libya no longer see 
him as a credible negotiating partner. 
Moreover, the war has caused a deep rift 
between western and eastern Libya, where 
few voices had spoken out against the war. 
The more the futility of Haftar’s offensive 
has become evident, the more secessionist 
sentiment has gained ground in the east. 
Turkish and Russian intervention also 
poses obstacles to a political settlement. In 
negotiations, Libyan parties would demand 
that their adversaries’ backers withdraw 
foreign elements, including Russian and 
Syrian mercenaries, Emirati drones, Russian 
fighter jets, and Turkish military assets. 
Moreover, an agreement that would re-
establish a single government, army com-
mand, and a central bank would also dilute 
Russian and Turkish influence. A unified 
government might ultimately seek to eject 
any foreign military presence. Russian and 
Turkish interests therefore lie in freezing 
the conflict, rather than resolving it. 
Haftar’s failure in Tripoli does nothing to 
alleviate the growing financial pressure on 
both sides. Since January 2020, Haftar has 
stopped oil exports in areas under his con-
trol. He is thereby preventing revenues 
from accruing to the Central Bank in Tripoli, 
which has refused to offer the eastern 
authorities associated with Haftar greater 
access to finance. To date, Western states 
have used UN sanctions on illegal oil ex-
ports to block Haftar’s recurrent attempts 
at selling oil independently. Any agreement 
between the two sides to resume oil exports 
would have to involve a reform of the 
Central Bank’s executive that reflects an 
arrangement on revenue distribution. 
Absent such a deal, fiscal conditions will 
worsen for both the Tripoli government 
and the eastern authorities associated with 
Haftar. This would also limit their ability 
to pay for foreign mercenaries and military 
hardware, as well as to reward their foreign 
sponsors with opportunities in the energy 
sector. Russia and Turkey face a dilemma: 
Negotiating a political settlement would 
risk curbing their influence, but merely 
freezing the conflict will undermine the 
economic viability of their interventions. 
Additional challenges emanate from 
foreign powers. A Turkish-Russian under-
standing would marginalise Haftar’s other 
foreign backers – the UAE, Egypt, and 
France – and empower Turkey, whose 
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regional policies are opposed by all three 
states. The US is alarmed over Russia’s de-
ployment of fighter jets and could bolster 
Turkey’s military posture in order to pre-
vent Russia from establishing permanent 
bases in Libya. All four powers will try to 
prevent or undermine a Russian-Turkish 
arrangement on Libya. This could exacer-
bate conflicts if different foreign powers 
back competing local actors. Rivalries 
between great and middle powers in Libya 
will also prevent the UN from regaining its 
role as a credible mediator between con-
flicting foreign and local interests. 
A Marginalised Europe 
Europeans stood by and watched as Libya’s 
war raged on and foreign intervention 
reached unprecedented levels. The primary 
reasons for their inaction were France’s 
policy of protecting Haftar, the initial tacit 
backing of the US for Haftar and its sub-
sequent indifference to the war, and Euro-
peans’ reluctance to confront the UAE and 
Egypt over their support for Haftar’s offen-
sive. This unwillingness to apply leverage 
also marked German diplomacy. 
The result of this policy was that Turkey 
and Russia filled the vacuum, while Euro-
peans lost credibility and influence. This 
will now limit their ability to mediate and 
to prod the GNA into taking urgently 
needed steps, such as strengthening its base 
and accountability, and containing newly 
empowered armed groups. 
Now that the catastrophic consequences 
of European inaction are evident and Haftar 
no longer has a chance to seize power, a 
policy shift is both possible and indispen-
sable. A Russian-Turkish condominium 
would neither reunify Libya nor serve the 
EU’s interest, even if it was sustainable. But 
opposing Russia and Turkey at the same time 
will not work, since this would push both 
states closer together. Two key goals should 
guide European policies: First, safeguard 
Libya’s unity; second, counter Russian 
influence in Libya as a matter of priority. 
The US shares both goals. But Europeans 
will only be able to act in unison if the 
French position shifts away from its relative 
tolerance for Russia and adversarial stance 
towards Turkey. Russia’s military presence 
in Libya represents a far greater menace to 
Europe than Turkish intervention. Reduc-
ing the Russian presence would also dimin-
ish the GNA’s dependence on Turkish pro-
tection, thereby addressing the concerns of 
member states that oppose the GNA due to 
their dispute with Turkey over maritime 
rights in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
Among the tools Europeans have at their 
disposal to pursue these goals, hard power 
does not feature prominently. EU member 
states no longer have the credibility needed 
to play a meaningful military role in Libya, 
and would only add to the confusion of for-
eign meddlers in the country. The EU mari-
time operation IRINI does little to prevent 
arms shipments from reaching Libya. It can, 
however, be used as a deterrent against 
illegal oil exports – which is crucial for 
preventing partition. 
Western leverage is strongest in the econo-
my and in the use of sanctions. Western 
states should continue to use their influ-
ence in international financial institutions 
as well as the global banking, insurance, 
and energy industries to prevent illegal oil 
exports and to work towards reforms at the 
Central Bank, and ultimately its reunifica-
tion. Paralysis in the UN Security Council 
raises the need for a more extensive use of 
EU and US sanctions against companies and 
individuals involved in violations of the arms 
embargo and attempts at illegal oil exports. 
The prosecution of war crimes under uni-
versal jurisdiction is essential as a deterrent 
for armed groups empowered by foreign 
sponsors. 
To curb Russian influence, the EU should 
wield sanctions to undermine Haftar, on 
whom Russia depends as a host and part-
ner. In parallel, Western states should 
finally push their interests in a stable Libya 
more strongly when engaging with Haftar’s 
other foreign supporters, particularly Egypt 
and the UAE, to dissuade them from further 
cooperation with Russia. 
Dr. Wolfram Lacher is a Senior Associate in the Middle East and Africa Division at SWP. 
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